

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 051976

O 141303Z MAR 75

FM US DELEGATION MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0894

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0110

EXDIS

DEPT PASS ACTION SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS 83

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: TRILATERAL PAPERS ON ARMS LIMITATIONS

REF: STATE 055652

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES THE US DELEGATION REACTION TO THE BRITISH AND GERMAN PAPERS ON ARMAMENTS LIMITATION (REFTEL) AND SUGGESTIONS FOR RESPONSES THAT COULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE US PAPER OR IN THE TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH ALLIED PAPERS CONTAIN CONCEPTS WHICH ARE SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES OVER THE USE OF NONCIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS IN THE ORIGINAL US PAPER. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIED PAPERS ALSO REFLECT SOME POSITIONS WITH WHICH WE DISAGREE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES' UNDERLYING CONCERNS CAN BE MET IN SUCH A WAY AS TO EXPEDITE NATO CONSIDERATION. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE US POSITION AS REFLECTED IN THE MARCH 7 INTERAGENCY PAPER. IT PROMISES TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH, PROVIDES A MORE MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATING PACKAGE THAN THE ORIGINAL PAPER, AND

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SHOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO LEAD TO NATO AGREEMENT.

END SUMMARY.

2. AREAS OF AGREEMENT

A) WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE TO EMPHASIZE THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT IN THE US, UK, AND FRG PAPERS. BOTH THE UK AND FRG PLACE GREAT STRESS ON THE AVOIDANCE OF QUALITATIVE, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS EXCEPT FOR US/SOVIET SUBCEILINGS. THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS MIGHT BE ADVANCED BY AN AFFIRMATIVE US STATEMENT THAT WE WILL OPPOSE ANY SUCH CONSTRAINTS.

B) SIMILARLY, THE GERMANS HAVE TWICE PROPOSED THAT THE OFFER OF US AIRCRAFT BE LIMITED TO A TRADE OF US NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT FOR PURELY CONVENTIONAL US MODELS. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO POINT OUT TO THE GERMANS THAT THE US EXPECTS THIS TO BE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF OPTION III. SPECIFICALLY, WE COULD NOTE THAT UNDER THE US PROPOSAL WE WOULD PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO REPLACE THE WITHDRAWN F-4S WITH PURELY CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT AND THAT IT IS OUR INTENTION TO DO SO. OUR TENTATIVE PLANS REFLECTED IN THE DPQ CALL FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF F-4S WITH F-15S.

3. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: AIRCRAFT

A. IN VIEWING THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, WE EMPLOY THREE CRITERIA. FIRST, WE WANT A DEFINITION THAT WOULD RESULT IN A MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINT ON US/NATO NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY. IF THE DEFINITION EMPLOYED WERE SO BROAD THAT NATO AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE NOT ACTUALLY NUCLEAR CAPABLE WERE INCLUDED IN THE CEILING, THEN THE NEGOTIATING VALUE OF OPTION III WOULD BE UNDERCUT SINCE NON-US NATO COULD EASILY COMPENSATE FOR THE WITHDRAWN US AIRCRAFT BY REPLACING SOME OF THE NON-NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT THAT WOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER A BROAD CEILING. THEREFORE THE DEFINITION SHOULD YIELD A NATO CEILING

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SIMILAR TO THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WHICH AS A PRACTICAL MATTER MIGHT BE USED IN A NUCLEAR ROLE. SECOND, SINCE OPTION III IS INTENDED AS A MAKE-WEIGHT, IT SHOULD NOT RESULT IN UNDUE CONSTRAINT ON SOVIET CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT. THUS, WE SEEK A DEFINITION WHICH WOULD OFFER SOME RECIPROCAL CONSTRAINT ON THE SOVIETS' ACTUAL NUCLEAR CAPACITY, WOULD SATISFY THE POLITICAL NEED FOR RECIPROCITY, BUT WOULD NOT

REQUIRE THE SOVIETS TO MODIFY THEIR CURRENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS SIGNIFICANTLY. THIRDLY, WE WANT A DEFINITION WHICH WOULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE OF SOME PRACTICAL FORM OF MONITORING. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY MAY NOT SUFFICE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE POSSIBLE FOR THE EAST TO KNOW IN SOME WAY THAT OPTION III HAD RESULTED IN MEANINGFUL LIMITATIONS ON NATO.

B. AS WE SEE IT THERE ARE THREE APPROACHES TO DEFINING NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. (1) NUCLEAR TASKED: SUCH A DEFINITION WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY NON-NEGOTIABLE, SINCE WHAT IS NUCLEAR TASKED CAN RAPIDLY BE ALTERED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. FOR EXAMPLE, US F-4E IS USED IN THE NGA IN BOTH THE AIR DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR TASKED ROLES. THE AIR DEFENSE SQUADRONS HAVE THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT QUICKLY TO BECOME NUCLEAR TASKED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER. VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR TASKING WOULD PRESENT VERY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS. (2) NUCLEAR-CAPABLE TYPES REPEAT TYPES (IF ONE, THEN ALL): AS USED IN THE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0110

EXDIS

DEPT PASS ACTION SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
FROM US REP MBFR

7 MARCH VPWG PAPER, THIS DEFINITION WOULD INCLUDE ALL F-4'S, F-104'S, MIG-21'S, ETC., EVEN IF ONLY SOME OF THEM ARE NUCLEAR CAPABLE. THE RESULT, AS VIEWED FROM AN ALLIED PROSPECTIVE, WOULD BE THAT NON-NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (SUCH AS THE GERMAN

F4F) WOULD BE CONSTRAINED. OPTION III THUS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF LIMITING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND WOULD COMPLICATE MODERNIZATION PLANS. VIEWED FROM AN EASTERN PERSPECTIVE, THIS DEFINITION WOULD RESULT IN A CEILING ON NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES WHICH WOULD BE SO HIGH AS TO BE MEANINGLESS. FOR EXAMPLE, TO REPLACE THE WITHDRAWN US AIRCRAFT, NATO COULD TRADE SOME OF ITS NON-NUCLEAR CF-104'S FOR NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-104G'S. THUS, WITHOUT EXCEEDING THE CEILING, NATO COULD INCREASE ITS HOLDINGS OF AIRCRAFT THAT ARE ACTUALLY CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ADDITIONALLY THIS BROAD DEFINITION WOULD RESULT IN CONSTRAINING VIRTUALLY ALL PACT MODERN COMBAT AIRCRAFT. (3) NUCLEAR CAPABLE MODELS REPEAT MODELS: THIS VARIANT OF THE MARCH 7 DEFINITION WOULD INCLUDE ONLY THOSE MODELS WHICH ARE ACTUALLY INTENDED TO HAVE A NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY. IT WOULD EMPLOY DESIGNATORS AND CONCEPTS GENERALLY ACCEPTED IN INTERNATIONAL AERONAUTICS, CONCEPTS WITH WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE FAMILIAR. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD INCLUDE
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THE F-4C,D,E AND M BUT EXCLUDE THE RF-4 AND F-4F. IN THE CASE OF THE MIG-21, IT WOULD INCLUDE THE MIG-21 J/K/L AND EXCLUDE THE MIG-21 C/D/F. THESE DISTINCTIONS DERIVE FROM THE CAPABILITIES OF THE EQUIPMENT AND THE TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE MODEL.

C. ALTHOUGH THIS APPROACH HAS SOME NEGOTIATING AND MONITORING DIFFICULTIES, WE BELIEVE IT IS PREFERABLE TO EITHER THE AIRCRAFT TYPE DEFINITION OR THE NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT DEFINITION. SOME CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURE WILL BE REQUIRED FOR FOLLOW-ON EQUIPMENT IN ANY CASE. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD HAVE SEVERAL ADVANTAGES: (1) THE RESIDUAL NATO CEILING WOULD INCLUDE ALL AIRCRAFT THAT A SOVIET PLANNER COULD VIEW AS BEING IN THE NUCLEAR THREAT BUT IT WOULD NOT BE ARTIFICALLY INFLATED BY INCLUDING AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE NOT REALLY NUCLEAR CAPABLE. (2) NATO'S CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT (F-4F, A-7D) WOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED. (3) BOTH SIDES COULD MODERNIZE THEIR CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT BY DEVELOPING MODELS (OF THE F-16 AND MIG-23, FOR EXAMPLE) WHICH WERE CONVENTIONAL ONLY. (4) IT WOULD NOT CODIFY THE DISPARITY IN MODERN COMBAT AIRCRAFT BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN ALL MODERN COMBAT AIRCRAFT. (5) AS COMPARED WITH THE MARCH 7 DEFINITION, IT WOULD MAKE THE PROPOSED REDUCTION MORE IMPRESSIVE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE CONSTRAINED CATEGORY -- AND BY LEAVING SOME

US AIRCRAFT NOW IN THE AREA UNCONSTRAINED, IT WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT OPTION III DEALS WITH NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND NOT COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL.

4. SSM'S: THE ALLIED PAPERS, PARTICULARLY THE BRITISH, APPEAR TO MISUNDERSTAND THE PERSHING LIMITATIONS ELEMENT. IT MIGHT BE EXPLAINED THAT IT IS NOT THE US INTENTION TO LIMIT IN ANY WAY THE NUMBER OF BATTLEFIELD SSM(S SUCH AS PLUTON, HONEST JOHN, LANCE, FROG, OR SCUD. RATHER THE US INTENDED LIMITS ON THE THEATER RANGE SYSTEMS (PERSHING AND SCALEBOARD) WHICH HAVE THE GREATEST PAYLOADS AND ARE THE MOST THREATENING ELEMENTS. CONSTRAINING SCUDS WOULD LESSEN THE VALUE OF OPTION III.

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THUS, WE AGREE WITH THE 500KM RANGE FORMULATION IN THE US MARCH 7 PAPER. WE RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBLE UK/FRG CONCERN THAT A CONSTRAINT ON THEATER SYSTEMS MIGHT INTERFERE TO SOME EXTENT WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME FUTURE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE MIGHT INCLUDE IR/MRBM'S IN THE NGA. HOWEVER, AS THE WESTERN STATES WOULD STILL HAVE A COLLECTIVE CEILING OF 108 SSM'S IN THE AREA, A LARGE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND NO PROHIBITION ON SLBM'S.

5. WARHEADS: WE CAN AGREE WITH THE BRITISH AND GERMANS THAT WARHEADS HAVE VERIFICATION ASPECTS THAT ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER ELEMENTS AND THAT MAY REQUIRE SOME FORM OF SPECIAL TREATMENT. GIVEN OUR PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET WARHEADS IN THE NGA AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MAY BECOME AVAILABLE IN THE FUTURE, WE MIGHT WISH TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO A SOVIET WARHEAD INCREASE, EVEN IF THAT INCREASE WOULD LEAVE THEM BELOW THE CURRENT US ESTIMATE OF THEIR HOLDINGS IN THE NGA. CONSEQUENTLY, WHILE THE US SHOULD STATE ITS NUMERICAL WARHEAD CEILING IN THE AGREEMENT, WE MIGHT PREFER A NO-INCREASE PROVISION ON SOVIET WARHEADS. A COLLATERAL CONSTRAINT ON SITES MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WARHEADS SHOULD BE TREATED IN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT. SEPARATING WARHEADS COULD MAKE THE WARHEAD ELEMENT APPEAR TO THE EAST TO BE LESS SUBSTANTIAL.

6. TANKS: IN THIS CONTEXT, THE BRITISH RAISED THE QUESTION OF FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS. THE USE OF THE

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0110

EXDIS

DEPT PASS ACTION SECEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

FROM US REP MBFR

DEFINITION IN THE MARCH 7 PAPER WOULD PRECLUDE A CEILING ON T-62S ALONE. THE T-70 COULD BE COVERED BY THE INCLUSION OF "FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM OF SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS" WITHIN THE STIPULATED NUMERIC CEILINGS, ALTHOUGH THE EAST AND WEST WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF EACH NEW SYSTEM WHEN IT WAS FIRST DEPLOYED IN THE NGA.

7. CATEGORY ONE. WE BELIEVE THAT SOLUTIONS TO THE DEFINITIONAL ISSUES WILL ADEQUATELY DEAL WITH UK AND FRG PROBLEMS WITH CATEGORY ONE.

8. CATEGORY TWO.

A) GIVEN CURRENT US PLANS, PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES, AND BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS, WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE US WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE ITS NGA TANK HOLDINGS ABOVE THE POST-NUNN AMENDMENT AUTHORIZED LEVELS. SINCE WE BELIEVE THAT USING US AUTHORIZED LEVELS IS A VIABLE AND NECESSARY NEGOTIATING POSITION, WE NEED NOT SEEK A FURTHER 15 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE US TANK CEILING.

B) WE HAVE DISCUSSED CATEGORY TWO CONSTRAINTS ON
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SSMS AND WARHEADS IN PARAS 3B AND 3C.

C) (1) AS TO SOVIET AIRCRAFT, WE DO NOT WISH TO USE A FORMULATION THAT WOULD CONSTRAIN SOVIET MODERNIZATION PLANS TO SUCH AN EXTENT THT THE NEGOTIATING IMPACT OF OPTION III WAS UNDERCUT. USE OF THE AIRCRAFT-TYPE/REPEAT TYPE DEFINITION, AS PROPOSED IN THE MARCH 7 PAPER, WOULD PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM REPLACING SEVERAL HUNDRED OLDER MODEL CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT NOW IN THE NGA WITH NEW MODELS SINCE THE NEW MODELS UNDER THIS DEFINITION WOULD BE NUCLEAR CAPABLE. USE OF THE AIRCRAFT MODEL REPEAT MODEL DEFINITION. AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS THE SAME OPTION IT WOULD GIVE THE US OF CREATING NON-NUCLEAR MODELS (OF DUAL-CAPABLE TYPES) FOR NON-NUCLEAR ROLES. SINCE NON-NUCLEAR MODELS WOULD BE UNCONSTRAINED, CONVENTIONAL MODERIZATION WOULD THEREFORE REMAIN POSSIBLE, WHILE MODERIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE FORCE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SOME CONSTRAINT.

(2) EVEN IF IT IS DECIDED THAT THE AIRCRAFT TYPE DEFINITION IS USED FOR CATEGORY ONE, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE AIRCRAFT MODEL DEFINITION FOR CATEGORY TWO IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE NEGOTIATING WEIGHT OF OPTION III BY ALLOWING THE SOVIETS TO MODERIZE THEIR NON-NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT.

(3) THE AIRCRAFT TYPE DEFINITION RESULTS IN A HIGH CEILING ON SOVIET NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. IF THAT DEFINITION WERE USED FOR CATEGORY TWO, THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH SUCH A HIGH SOVIET CEILING MIGHT BE DIMINISHED BY FORMULATING THE CATEGORY TWO LIMITATIONS AS NO-INCREASE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT EXPLICIT NUMBERS IN THE AGREEMENT.

CATEGORY THREE.

A) WITH REGARD TO CATEGORY THREE LIMITATIONS, WE NOTED THAT BOTH THE UK AND FRG OPPOSE ALLOWING ANY INCREASES IN NSWP TANKS. WE AGREE THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DEMAND A COLLECTIVE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT
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BY THE WARSAW PACT ON MAIN BATTLE TANKS, SINCE ANYTHING LESS STRINGENT WOULD PERMIT SOME OF THE 1,700 SOVIET TANK REDUCTION TO BE COMPENSATED BY NSWP INCREASES. IN RETURN, WE BELIEVE THAT THE

ALLIES COULD ACCEPT A COLLECTIVE COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THOSE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS REDUCED BY THE US IN CATEGORY ONE. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT, FOR ANY OF THE DEFINITIONS OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT NOTED ABOVE, PLANNED ALLIED DRAWDOWNS IN THE NEAR FUTURE WILL BE LARGE ENOUGH TO LEAVE ROOM FOR THE UK INCREASE IN NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THEIR UK PAPER. (WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY WISH TO CONFIRM THIS POINT IN DETAIL PRIOR TO THE MEETING OF THE TRILATERAL WORKING GROUP.)

B) WE WOULD NOT WANT TO ALLOW ANY INCREASE IN NSWP TANKS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT TO HINDER ALLIED TANK INCREASES. THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THERE IS MERIT IN THE UK SUGGESTION TO DISTINGUISH WITHIN CATEGORY THREE BETWEEN NSWP TANKS AND NON-US NATO TANKS AND NSWP NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ON THE OTHER.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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EXDIS

DEPT PASS ACTION SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

FROM US REP MBFR

C) THUS, WE BELIEVE WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY WISH TO CONSIDER ACCEPTING THE FRG POSITION THAT ALLIED TANKS BE UNCONSTRAINED AND ADDING THE LOGICAL PARALLEL POSITION THAT WE DO NOT SEEK TO RESTRAIN

NSWP NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF THE SOVIETS GIVING THEIR ALLIES PEACETIME CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WARHEADS OR THEATER-RANGE SSMS. AS FOR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, OPTION III WOULD LOSE MUCH OF ITS NEGOTIATING WEIGHT IF CATEGORY III LIMITATIONS PREVENTED MODERIZATION OF NSWP AIR FORCES. THE ALLIES DO NOT SEEK TO PREVENT THE USE OF MORE MODERN NSWP AIRCRAFT IN A CONVENTIONAL ROLE, AND WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PLAN ON A SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR ROLE FOR NSWP AIRCRAFT.

D) IF THE MARGINAL DISADVANTAGES OF LEAVING NSWP NUCLEAR CAPABILITY UNCONSTRAINED ARE ACCEPTED, THE ALLIES WOULD DERIVE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGES FROM MAINTAINING IN RETURN THAT NON-US NATO TANKS SHOULD BE COMPLETELY UNRESTRICTED. OMITTING SUCH A RESTRICTION WOULD ALLOW ALLIED CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. IT WOULD MEET THE UK DESIRE TO AVOID CODIFYING A TANK DISPARITY, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING THE DIFFICULT TASK OF GAINING EASTERN
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AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING ON ARMAMENTS. (FOR THAT MATTER, THE ABSENCE OF RESTRAINT ON NSWP NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WOULD AVOID FORMAL CODIFICATION OF DISPARITIES IN THE AREA AS WELL.) IT WOULD MEET THE FRG DESIRE TO AVOID A NEGOTIATION ON ALL ASPECTS OF ARMAMENTS IN THE NGA, AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OPTION III WAS A FINITE NEGOTIATING PACKAGE. (WE ALSO NOTE THAT THE FRG PAPER DOES NOT EXPRESS A WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT EUROPEAN TANKS EVEN IN PHASE II.) FINALLY, BY REFUSING TO OFFER THE LIMITATION ON NON-US NATO TANKS, WHICH THE EAST PLAINLY DESIRES, THE ALLIES WOULD PRESERVE SOME BARGAINING LEVERAGE FOR PHASE II.

E) EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT IN THE END AGREE TO REDUCE THEIR TANKS WHILE LEAVING FRG TANKS TOTALLY UNCONSTRAINED, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS POSITION COULD BE TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS IN CONSULTATIONS ON OPTION THREE WITH THE ALLIES AND SERVE AS A GOOD OPENING POSITION WITH THE EAST. RESOR

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